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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 870177-CA

APPEAL FROM THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT
OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

HELEN SCHUMANN,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
against
DAVID BARBER,
Defendant, Petitioner.

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to § 78-6-10
(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986, providing that
matters heard in the Small Claims Department of the Circuit Court
may be appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals.

This

appeal comes from a final judgment by the Small Claims Court of
the Fifth Circuit wherein that Court denied the Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.

Case Historv
This appeal comes from a small claims action commenced on
the 13th day of February 1987, by the Plaintiff Helen Schumann,
wherein the Defendant David Barber was served on the 21st day of
February, 1987, On the 4th day of March, 1987, a special appearance was made at the hearing in this matter on behalf of the
Defendant, who was out of town, to request a two-day continuance
from the attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small Claims Court.
This request was denied.
After denial of a two-day continuance in this matter, the
attorney-judge pro tempore entered a default judgment against the
Defendant.
On the 23rd day of March, 1987, Judge Phillip Palmer, a duly
appointed Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court, entered an Order
quashing execution of judgment in this action until such time as
he could hear the Defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment.

Thereafter, on April 16, 1987, Judge Phillip Palmer

entered an Order relinquishing the Fifth Circuit Court's jurisdiction over this matter and transferring the matter back to the
Small Claims Department.
On May 5, 1987, an attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small
Claims Court denied the Defendant's motion to set aside the
default judgment.
This appeal challenges each of the judicial actions listed
above.

Constitutional Provisions
and Statutes Involved
The text of the following constitutional provisions and
statutes relevant to the determination of the present case are
set forth in appendices:

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1; U.S. Const.

ASmend VI; Utah Const. Art. I § 7; Utah Const. Art. VIII § § 5 , 8
and 11; § 78-6-1 of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986; §
78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1981; § 78-6-8 of the
Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986; § 78-6-10 of the Utah Code Ann.,
as amended 1986.
Questions Presented
1.

Was the denial of a continuance on the 4th day of

March, 1987, an abuse of discretion?
2.

Was the Small Claims Court's refusal to allow associate

counsel to appear as an authorized agent of the Defendant on May
5, 1987 a violation of § 78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as
amended 1986?
3.

Was the failure of the Small Claims Court to set aside

the default judgment an abuse of discretion?
4.

Did the failure of the Fifth Circuit Court to exercise

supervisory authority over the Small Claims Court deny Defendant
his rights to due process?
5.

Is § 78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1981,

void as an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power?

-6-

Statement of the Case
1.

Defendant, David Earber ("Defendant") was served with

Plaintiff's Complaint on February 21, 1987.

The Defendant's

business activities are very time consuming, requiring a great
deal of travel and Defendant was not able to deliver the Complaint to his counsel until ten days later.

When counsel was

contacted by Defendant, counsel was informed by the Defendant
that he would be out of town on the day of the hearing due to
business.

After reviewing this matter, counsel determined that a

counterclaim should be filed.

Counterclaims, however, must be

filed at least two (2) days prior to the hearing and counsel was
not able to meet this deadline.
2.

Counsel for Defendant then contacted the Plaintiff and

requested a two-day continuance.
request.

The Plaintiff refused this

Counsel then contacted the Defendant and agreed to

appear as an agent for the Defendant at the trial for the sole
purpose of requesting a continuance from the attorney-judge pro
tempore assigned to this matter.

The attorney-judge pro tempore,

after expressing uncertainty whether to grant the requested
continuance and being unfamiliar with regular small claims court
procedure, then consulted with the court clerk, not a member of
the Utah Bar.

After so doing, the attorney-judge pro tempore

stated that should her decision prove wrong, the Defendant could
appeal and, therefore, denied the Defendant's request for a
continuance.

The Defendant, not having time to properly prepare
-7-

for trial, or to submit his answer and counterclaim to this
action, and being out of the state on the day of the trial due to
business, was forced to allow a default to be entered against
him.
3.

On the 23rd day of March, 1987, counsel for Defendant

submitted to Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth Circuit Court an
Ex Parte Motion for an Order Staying Enforcement of the Default
Judgment until such time as Judge Palmer could hear the Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment.

Judge Phillip

Palmer granted the Defendant!s Ex Parte Motion.
4.

Thereafter, on the 1st day cf April, 1987, Defendant

filed his motion to set aside the default judgment on the grounds
of inadvertence or excusable neglect.

On April 16, 1987, repre-

sentatives for Plaintiff and Defendant met with Judge Phillip
Palmer in his chambers, wherein Judge Palmer stated that the
Fifth Circuit Court no longer maintained a supervisory position
over the Small Claims Department and that any action in this
matter could only be reviewed by an attorney-judge pro tempore of
the Small Claims Court.

Judge Phillip Palmer then entered an

Order transferring this matter back to the Small Claims Department of the Fifth Circuit Court.
5.

On the 5th day of May, 1987, Defendant's motion to set

aside the default judgment came on for hearing before an attorney-judge pro tempore.

An associate of counsel for Defendant, a

member of the California State Bar in good standing, appeared as
-8-

an authorized agent on behalf of the Defendant pursuant to §
78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986.

The attorney-

judge pro tempore, expressed uncertainty as to whether an individual could appear through an agent, and not having time to
review the file or small claims court procedure prior to the
hearing, refused to allow associate counsel to appear on behalf
of the Defendant.

Associate counsel then requested that the

Court on its own motion grant a continuance wherein the uncertainty surrounding § 78-6-1(2) could be resolved or alternative
counsel could appear on behalf of the Defendant.
refused to do so.

The Court

The attorney-judge pro tempore, after stating

that he did not want to become involved in a complex or drawn out
proceeding and expressing his desire to make a ruling on the
narrowest grounds possible in order to dispense with the matter,
ruled that the Defendant had failed to appear and denied the
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment based upon
said lack of appearance.

On the 11th day of May, 1987, Defendant

filed his Notice to Appeal.
Summary of Argument
The fundamental questions presented by this appeal are (i)
whether the actions of the Small Claims Court and the Circuit
Court throughout the entire proceedings were an abuse of discretion and operated to deny the Defendant his constitutional
right to due process; (ii) whether an authorized agent may appear
before the Small Claims Court on behalf of an individual as well
-9-

as on behalf of a corporation; (iii) is the appointment by the
Circuit Court of attorney-judges pro tempore to the Small Claims
Courts of the Circuit Court, which court is a court of record, an
unconstitutional appointment and delegation of judicial power.
The actions of the Small Claims Court in denying the Defendant's request for a two-day continuance on May 4, 1987, and the
subsequent entry of default judgment, in conjunction with the
refusal of Judge Phillip Palmer to entertain the Defendant's
motion to set aside the default judgment on March 23, 1987, and
the transfer of this matter back to the small claims department,
and the refusal on the 5th day of May, 1987, to allow an
associate of counsel for Defendant to appear as an authorized
agent, or to grant a continuance on the Court's own motion
whereby questions surrounding this matter or alternative counsel
could appear for Defendant and the Court's failure to set aside
the default judgment were all abuses of discretion and operated
to deny the Defendant his constitutional rights of due process.
Section 78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986,
specifically allows for persons as well as corporations to appear
through authorized employees.

The refusal of the Small Claims

Court on May 5, 1987, to allow an associate of counsel for Defendant to appear as an authorized agent on behalf of Defendant
pursuant to § 78-6-1(2), in order to present the Defendant's
motion to set aside the default judgment is in direct contradiction with § 78-1-6-1(2) and hence, the Small Claims Court's
-in-

denial of the Defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment, based solely upon the Defendant!s lack of personal
appearance, is in error and should be reversed by this Court,
By 1986 amendment to the Utah Judicial Code, § 78-6-8 of the
Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986, the small claims courts of the
circuit courts are courts of record.

The Utah Constitution

Article VIII § § 8 and 11, flatly require that judges pro tempore
to courts of record be appointed either by the governor or chief
justice of the supreme court or by special rule of the Supreme
Court.

Judges pro tempore of small claims courts within the

circuit court are presently appointed by the Circuit Court,
according to statute, § 78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code Ann., as
amended 1981, and hence their appointment is a direct: violation
of Art. VIII § § 8 and 11 of the Utah Constitution and, therefore,
such appointments are unconstitutional and without force.
The denial of the Defendant's constitutional rights of due
process by an array of abuses by the lower courts, and the
unconstitutional appointment of attorney-judges pro Cempore to
the Small Claims Court requires that the Defendant's motion to
set aside the default judgment be granted so that he may be heard
in this matter and that he be allowed to submit his answer and
counterclaim.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Denial of a Two-Day Continuance
Was an Abuse of Discretion
Due to the Defendant's being out of town on the day set for
trial, and because of the Defendant's lack of time to properly
prepare a defense in this matter, or to submit his counterclaim,
an associate of counsel for Defendant appeared before the small
claims judge pro tempore on the day and time set for trial for
the sole purpose of requesting a two-day continuance in this
matter.
The attorney-judge pro tempore denied this request.

In so

doing, the attorney-judge pro tempore stated that she was uncertain as to whether such a continuance could be granted by the
small claims court, and after consulting with the court clerk,
not a member of the Utah Bar, she stated that should her denial
of a continuance prove wrong, the Defendant could always appeal.
The denial of a two-day continuance is a clear abuse of discretion.

As the Utah Supreme Court so succinctly stated in

Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 369, 371
(Utah 1980):
The uniform
law is to accord
for a hearing on
be done without
other party.

acknowledged policy of the
litigants the opportunity
the merits, where that can
serious injustice to the

.1 9-

The granting of a two-day continuance would have accorded
the Defendant his constitutional right to present evidence and
confront witnesses.

U.S. Const. Amend VI.

A two-day continuance in this matter would not have caused
injustice, nor would it have prejudiced the rights of the Plaintiff.

Its denial, however, resulted in the entry of a default

judgment against the Defendant and substantially prejudiced his
rights in this matter.

Hence, the denial of a continuance by the

attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small Claims Court was a clear
abuse of discretion.
II.
An Individual Defendant May Appear in
Small Claims Court Through an Authorized Agent
Section 78-6-1(2) of the Utah Code Ann., as amended 1986,
reads:
Persons or corporations may litigate
actions on behalf of themselves in person or
through authorized employees with or without
counsel. [Emphasis addedj.
On May 5, 1987, an associate of counsel for Defendant, a
member of the California State Bar in good standing, appeared as
an authorized agent on behalf of the Defendant pursuant to
§ 78-6-1(2), in order to present Defendant's motion to set aside
the default judgment.
The attorney-judge pro tempore presiding over this hearing
stated that he was not familiar with § 78-6-1(2), as amended in
1986, and was uncertain as to whether an individual as well as a
-13-

corporation could appear through an authorized agent.

After

reviewing § 78-6-1(2), the attorney-judge pro tempore ruled that
an individual could not appear through an authorized agent, and
that §78-6-1(2) provided only for corporations to appear through
an authorized employee.

The attorney-judge pro tempore then

refused to hear arguments in this matter and ruled that the
Defendant had failed to appear and, hence, denied the Defendant's
motion to set aside the default judgment based upon said lack of
personal appearance by the Defendant.
The attorney-judge pro tempore1s ruling flies directly in
the face of § 78-6-1(2), as amended, which specifically states
persons, or corporations may litigate on behalf of themselves in
person or through an authorized agent.

The attorney-judge pro

temporeT s interpretation of § 78-6-1(2) is in error, and hence,
the attorney-judge pro tempore1s ruling denying the Defendant's
motion to set aside the default judgment based upon Defendant's
lack of personal appearance must be overturned as in direct
violation of § 78-6-1(2).
III.
The Refusal of the Small Claims Court to Allow the
Defendant to Present His Motion to Set Aside the"""
Default Judgment and Its Failure to Set Aside the
Default Judgment Were an Abuse of Discretion
On the 5th day of May, 1987, Defendant's motion to set aside
the default judgment came on for hearing before an attorney-judge
pro tempore of the Small Claims Court.

-1 A .

Because the Small Claims

Court refused to allow Defendant to appear through an authorized
agent, and would not on its own motion grant a continuance
wherein uncertainty surrounding representation by an authorized
agent could be resolved or alternative counsel could appear on
behalf of the Defendant, the Small Claims Court denied

the

Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment based solely
upon the Defendant's lack of personal appearance.

The refusal by

the Small Claims Court to grant a continuance whereby the Defendant would be allowed to present his motion to set aside the
default judgment and the Court's failure to set aside the default
are a clear abuse of discretion.
In Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 269,
371 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court in vacating the judgment
of the lower court, which court had refused to set aside the
default judgment, stated:
However, they (default judgments) are
not favored in law, especially where a party
has timely responded with challenging pleadings. . . .
The Court went on to state in dicta:
...it is to be kept in mind that access to
the courts for the protection of rights and
the settlement of disputes is one of the most
important factors in the maintenance of a
peaceable and well-order* d society....
To
that end, the courts are generally indulgent
toward setting aside of default judgments.
Id. at 371.
In the following this policy, the Court held:

-1 5-

Consistent with the objective just stated
where there is doubt about whether a default
should be set aside, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of doing so, to the end
that each party may have an opportunity to
present his side of the controversy and that
there be a resolution in accordance with law
and justice.
Id. at 371.
The Supreme Court then vacated the lower court's order and
remanded the matter back to the lower court for a hearing on the
merits.
The refusal of the attorney-judge pro tempore to grant a
continuance on the Court's own motion in order to assure that the
Defendant could be heard and the Court's failure to set aside the
default judgment are in direct contradiction to the stated policy
of the law as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Interstate
Excavating, supra, to allow all litigants the right to be heard
in accordance with law and justice and to resolve all doubts in
favor of the setting aside of default judgments.

Hence, the

ruling of the Small Claims Court is a clear abuse of discretion
and should be set aside, in order that the Defendant may be heard
in this matter.
IV.
Section 78-6-1.5 of Utah Code Anr ^
Is an Unconstitutional Delegation of Judicial Power
Section 78-6-1.5 reads in pertinent part:
If at any time public necessity and
convenience will be better served by making
-16-

the small claims court available during
evening hours in addition to day-time settings, the circuit court may enter an order
appointing a member or members of the UtafiT
State Bar in good standing, with the members
consent, as small claims court judge(s) pro
tempore^ who after being duly sworn, shall
serve voluntarily and without compensation at
the request of the court, shall be extended
the same immunities and shall have the same
powers with respect to matters within the
jurisdiction of the small claims court as may
be exercised by dul}^ elected circuit judges.
[Emphasis added] .
Article VIII § 8 of the Utah Constitution states:
Judges of courts not of record shall be
selected in a manner, for a term, and with
qualifications provided by statute. [Emphasis
added].
However, Article VIII § 11 of the Utah Constitution states
in relevant part:
When a vacancy occurs on a court of
record, the governor shall fill the vacancy
by appointment .... If the governor fails to
fill the vacancy within the time prescribed,
the chief justice of the supreme court shall
. . . make the appointment. . . . The senate
shall consider and render a decision in each
judicial appointment within 30 days of the
date of appointment.... [Emphasis added].
Article VIII § 4 of the Utah Constitution provides in
pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, the supreme court by rule may
authorize retired justices and judges and
judges pro tempore to perform any judicial
duties.... [Emphasis added].
Hence, prior to § 78-6-8 of the Utah Code Ann. as amended in
1986, judges pro tempore of the small claims courts, which court
-17-

was not a court of record, could be appointed as provided by
statute.

Utah Const. Art. VIII § 11. However, by 1986 amendment

to the Utah Code, § 78-6-8 of the Utah Code, as amended 1986, the
small claims courts of the circuit court became courts of record,
hence, the appointment of any judge pro tempore to the small
claims court of the circuit court, after January 1986, can only
be by appointment of the governor or chief justice of the supreme
court with senate confirmation or as authorized by special rule
of the supreme court.

Utah Const. Art. VIII § § 4 and 11.

Hence, the present appointment of judges pro tempore by the
circuit court as provided by statute, § 78-6-1.5 of the Utah Code
as amended 1981, is in direct contradiction with Article VIII
§ § 4 and 11 and, therefore, these appointments are unconstitutional and without validity.

Consequently, any decision rendered

by a judge pro tempore of the small claims court so appointed is
without binding force in law or fact.
V.
Failure of the Fifth Circuit Court to Exercise
Supervisory Authority over The Small Claims Court
Denied Defendant His Constitutional Rights to
Due Process and is in Contradiction to
§ 78-6-1 of Utah Code Ann."
On April 16, 1987, representatives for Plaintiff and Defendant appeared before Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth Circuit
Court to have the Defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment heard, which default judgment has previously been
entered by the Small Claims Court of the Fifth Circuit Court
-18-

after that Court refused to grant Defendant's two-day continuance
to respond in this matter.

Judge Phillip Palmer refused to

entertain the Defendant's motion to set aside the default
judgment and entered an Order relinquishing jurisdiction of the
Fifth Circuit Court and transferring the matter back to the Small
Claims Department.

At the time of entering this Order, Judge

Palmer stated in his chambers to representatives of the Plaintiff
and Defendant that the Fifth Circuit Court no longer maintained a
supervisory position over the Small Claims Department of the
Fifth Circuit Court, and that any action in this matter could
only be reviewed by an attorney-judge pro tempore of the Small
Claims Court.
Section 78-6-1 of the Utah Code Ann. as amended 1986,
provides:
There is created in the circuit courts
and justice's courts of this state, a department known as the "Small Claims Court", which
has jurisdiction, but not exclusive, in
cases:
(a) for the recovery of money where the
amount claimed does not exceed $1,000
and where the defendant resides or the
action of indebtedness was incurred in
the jurisdiction of the court in which
the action is maintained; ... [emphasis
added].
The refusal by Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth Circuit
Court to exercise any supervisory authority over the attorneyjudges pro tempore of the Small Claims Court, a department within
the Circuit Court, who exercise their position without election
-19-

or official appointment and who generally have no prior judicial
experience in this area, which position is purely part-time and
noncompensator}', § 78-6-1 of the Utah Code Ann. as amended 1986,
is a violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights to due
process of the law.

Such a position by the Fifth Circuit Court,

if allowed to persist, would result in a Small Claims Department
of the Circuit Court whose behavior and decisions are totally
unchecked and without supervision.

This argument is supported by

the fact that by 1986 amendment to the Code, see § 78-6-10(2) of
the Utah Code Ann. as amended 1986, a trial de novo is no longer
available to defendants in matters heard in the small claims
department of the circuit courts, and the sole recourse from any
decision rendered by a small claims court is appellate review by
this Court, the filing fees and bond costs of which are approximately $500.00.
The Defendant has the constitutional right to have the law
as applied to him administered in a manner that will safeguard
and protect his individual rights, and to have the course of
legal proceedings occur in that manner established by our system
of jurisprudence for the regular enforcement and protection of an
individual's rights.
Art. 1 § 7.

See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1; Ut. Const.

The refusal by Judge Phillip Palmer of the Fifth

Circuit Court to exercise authority over the Small Claims Court,
a department of the Fifth Circuit, which court does not have
exclusive jurisdiction and is presided over solely by attorney-20-

judges pro tempore who do not have sufficient time to properly
prepare for matters presented and often lack sufficient experience in administering the law, violated the constitutional due
process rights of the Defendant to have his motion heard by a
duly appointed and elected judge of the Circuit Court in order to
assure a fair and reasonable trial on the merits (U.S. Const.
Amend. VI), and to have his claims heard in that manner provided
by law for the regular enforcement and protection of his rights.

Conclusion
For all the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully
requests that the default judgment in this matter be set aside,
in order that this matter may be decided on the merits, and that
Petitioner be allowed to present his answer and counterclaim in
this matter.
tl&^—/
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tht&^-V
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"xjqfy of
ofAugust, 1987.
^afr

CERTIFICATE OF M A I L W /
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j/Lf

^ay of August, 1987, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Appellant's
Brief" by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to:
Helen Schumann
3782 South 20th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8A109
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Appendix A
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.

oo

Appendix B
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Amendment XIV
Section ]
All persons born or naturalized i n the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States nd of the State wherein they reside
No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or ininn rnities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, II berty, or property, without di le
process of law; nor deny to any person within I ts jurisdiction
the equal protection of the 3 aws,

Appendix C
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Art. 1 Sec. 7 [Due process of law].
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

-?S-

Appendix F
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Art. VIII
Sec, 4. [Rule-making power of supreme court - Jude?~ ~r^ tempore
- R e gti 1 a 11 on o f pr a c t i c e o f 1 aw ]
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The legislature may amend the
rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the supreme court upon
a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constituti on,
the supreme court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah
residents, and admitted to practice law in I Jtah, The supreme
court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of
persons admitted to practice law

-?fi-

Appendix E
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Art, VIII
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts - Right
of appeal].
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and
power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall
be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause.
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Appendix F
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec 8 (Vacancies - 'Nominatii ig commissioi is

Senate approva 1 "l

\ Illen a vacancy occnrs i n a cour t of record , the gr v errrr
shall fill the vacancy by appoi ntment from a list of at least
three nominees certified to the governor by the judicial nominating commission having authority over the vacancy. The governor
shall fill the vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of
nominees. If the governor fails to fill the vacancy within the
time prescribed, the chief justice of the supreme court shall
within 20 days make the appointment from,, the li st of nominees.
The legislature by statute shall provide for the nominating
commissions 1 composition and procedures. No member of the
legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the legislature
appoint members to, any judicial nominating commission. The
senate shal 1 consider and render a decision on each judicial
appointment within 30 days of the date of appointment. If
necessary, the senate shall convene Itself in extraordinary
sessions for the purpose of considering judicial appointments.
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a majority of
all members of the senate. If the senate fails to approve the
appointment, the office shall be considered, vacant and a new
irinating process shal ] commence. Selection of judges shall be
based solely upon consideration of fitness for office without
regard to any partisan pc 1: *-1 c i \ cons 1 dera t•? rms .
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Appendix G
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Art. VIII
Sec. 11. [Judges of courts not of record].
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided by statute.
However, no qualification may be imposed which requires judges of
courts not of record to be admitted to practice law. The number
of judges of courts not of record shall be provided by statute.
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Appendix. H
UTAH JUDICIAL CODE
78-6-1"! Creation - Jurisdiction - Coi msel not necessary
DeferrI ng mu 11i p 1 e c 1 a 1 ms of one p 1 a 1 n11 f f.
(] ) There is created in the circuit courts and justice's
i: 1: .s of this state, a department known as the "SMALL CLAIMS
RT," which has jurisdiction, but' not exclusive, in cases:
(a) for the i eco vex y of money where the amount claimed
does not exceed $1,000 and where the defendant resides or the
••••. "ion of indebtedness was incurred within the jurisdiction of
th*. -ourt i n whi ch the actl on 1 s to be man ntained; or

("fa) 1 nvolving interpleader u n d e r Rule 22 of the I Itah
i uivil P r o c e d u r e , in w h i c h the amount claimed does n o t
cAuecii "u'p- Jurisdiction o f the court,
( J. ) Persons or corporations m a y litigate actions o n b e h a l f
o f t h ems e 1 ve s in p er s on or thr oi igh ai i th o r i z e d emp 1 o y e e s wi th or
wi *rhou t c oun s e 1
(3) If a person or corporation files TIIUI tiple claims in ai n
one small claims c o u r t , the clerk of judge of the court m a y
i amove a l l b u t the initial claim from, the court's calendar in
or der to dispose of a l l other small claims court m a t t e r s . Clad m s
so removed shall b e r e s c h e d u l e d as p e r m i t t e d b y the court's
calendar.
_ •
78-6-1 , 5 Evend ng hours - Speci al ly appoi nted judges p r o - t e m p o r e .
I f a t ai ly t ime pub lie ne c e s s i t y ai id c on v en i en c e wi 11 b e
better served b y m a k i n g the small clai m s court available during
= r sning hours in addition to day-time s e t t i n g s , the circuit court
i: i ay enter an order appointing a m e m b e r or m e m b e r s of the U t a h
St ate Bar in good standing, w i t h the m e m b e r ' s c o n s e n t , as small
claims court j u d g e ( s ) p r o - t e m p o r e to hear and. determine those
small claims at tim.es to b e set by the court.
Such specially
aj: poi nted small claims court j u d g e ) s ) p r o - t e m p o r e , after being
duly sworn, shall serve v o l u n t a r i l y and 'without compensation at
the request of the c o u r t , shall be extended the same i m m u n i t i e s ,
and shall h a v e the same powers wi th respect to m a t t e r s w i t h i n the
j u r i s d i c t i o n of the -mall claims court as m a y be exercised by
du 1 y e 1 e c t e d c ir cu i t ; *;.J ? e«;.
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Appendix I
UTAH JUDICIAL CODE
78-6-8. Pleadings and hearings informal, exception - Attachment,
garnishment, and execution may issue.
No formal pleading, other than the affidavit and notice, is
necessary, and the hearing and disposition of the actions may be
informal, except that the circuit court shall maintain the
proceeding on the record as in any other case, with the sole
object of dispensing speedy justice between the parties. Attachment, garnishment, and execution may issue after judgment in the
manner prescribed by law upon the payment of the fees allowed by
law for those services.
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Appendix J
UTAH JUDICIAL CODE
78-6-1 P
Smal 1 claimA t t c — u -

' •••

- W h e n conclusi ^ re

Exception • -ppeal

p

--

(1 ) The j udgment o f the sma 11 c 1 a ims dep artment o f r r e~
j u s t i c e s 1 and circuit court is conclusi .ve u p o n the nl ai r-ri;"unless a counterclaim h a s b e e n interposed
(2) I f t h e in a 11 e r is heard in t h e s m a 11 c 1 a iiii s i = p = r t m e n t o f
the circuit court, the defendant m a y appeal the ]n .dgmei it of the
circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of
appeal wi thi n f 1 ve days of the entry of the j udgment against him.
(3) If the matter is heard in the smal 1 claims department of
the justices1 court, the defendant may obtain a trial de novo in
the circuit court by filing in the circuit court of the county a
petition for trial de novo within five days of the entry of the
j udgment against h im.
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